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Reassembling the political: placing contentious politics in Jordan 
Christopher Parker & Pascal Debruyne 
Introduction 
On 14 January 2011, Jayeen—a front of Jordanian activist groupings (the name means 
‘we are on our way’)—called for a day of anger. People of diverse backgrounds and 
ideological commitments responded to the call, coming out on to the streets to demand the 
ouster of Prime Minister Samir Rafa’i and his government. The regional context added to the 
headiness of the moment. Jordan’s citizens seemed to be inscribing themselves into the 
wider upheaval—the global moment—that would soon be known as the Arab Spring.  
Watching the news at the time, one might be forgiven for thinking that the call for protest 
had arrived in Jordan by way of Cairo or Tunis. But the coverage was misleading. Protest 
had become a regular feature of Jordan’s political landscape over the preceding years. This 
protest was not oriented against the ubiquitous abstraction of the authoritarian regime. Nor 
was it oriented towards some abstract notion of liberal freedom as such. It was much more 
situated and—on the surface, at least—much more local than that. The demonstrators were 
responding to very real changes that had been brought about by more than a decade of 
rapid and dramatic neoliberal restructuring, changes that dramatically impacted not only 
upon livelihoods, but also on peoples’ sense of place and community. The fact that they 
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came together and took to the streets in January 2011 was not a spontaneous effect of 
social media, nor the mirroring of television coverage of distant events. It was the result of 
sustained efforts at organizing, and of connecting the dots between seemingly diverse and 
place-bound contexts of interest, identity and struggle. 
It is always difficult to place, or to pin a date on, the start of a trend or movement. But 31 
July 2009, when ‘gendarmerie forces in the southern Jordanian city of Aqaba used violence 
to break up a sit-in by workers at the general cargo port,’ might be put forward as the first 
clear indication of an impending Jordanian Spring.1   According to a US Embassy wire 
released by Wikileaks, ‘The protest is connected to the sale of the land which the port sits on 
to an Emirati conglomerate (Al Maabar) in 2008. Mismanagement of the sale and its social 
consequences led to friction between port workers and the government owners of the port.’ 
But, while this event was noteworthy for the violence it provoked, it was part of a trend that 
stretched back several years. As early as 2002, day laborers, factory workers, teachers, 
public sector employees and even retired army officers were visibly engaged in the formation 
of new and increasingly activist affiliations (see Adely, 2012). These new movements were 
emerging in response to situations similar to those that had obtained in Aqaba. The problem 
was not so much the abuse of state power as such, but the consequences of its 
privatization. Government was being articulated (and political economy transformed) through 
an array of place making projects and agencies. These included, inter alia, special economic 
zones, megalomaniacal urban regeneration projects, new planning agencies and 
development authorities, public-private partnerships and community-based initiatives. These 
arrangements not only announced new practices and styles of governing; they 
fundamentally restructured relations between people, between people and the artifacts of 
their daily experience, and between people and the places they inhabited. In short, protest 
emerged from within a variegated array of place making projects, each of which advanced or 
responded to a market oriented logic of ‘reform;” and each of which identified, essentialized 
and instrumentalized local difference in the production or management of neoliberal effects 
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(Parker, 2014). The challenge for protesters was thus to recognize and articulate a critique 
that transcended the particularism of individual protest actions in diverse locales. This 
critique did not descend pre-given from the global ether: it is a product of struggle, and it is 
still in the making in Jordan. 
Starting from an account of how neoliberal place making projects in Amman dis-placed 
existing relations of government and power—both in the city and beyond—we draw on in-
depth interviews with activists, and a critical reading of Jordan’s recent political economic 
past, to show how protesters have struggled to re-place those relations, articulating an 
alternative platform from which make their own political counter-claims intelligible and 
effective. Place, in our perspective, is not seen as something that is reducible to an 
endogenous essence: rather, places emerge by virtue of the distinctiveness of the particular 
connections that meet within and through them (see Massey, 2005),2 and by virtue of the 
dominant paradigms that make place legible and recognizable as such. It is also important to 
note that the current expressions of protest in Jordan also have a much deeper genealogy, 
reflecting identities and interests articulated over a longer history of engagement with the 
forces of capitalism, imperialism and state-making. Consistent with the point made 
immediately above, the seemingly local places that provide the immediate setting for protest 
in Jordan are themselves the product of earlier rounds of global engagement (Parker, 2009, 
119). Indeed, place does not simply indicate the arena of social struggle; it is a constituent 
stake in that struggle.  
Nor has protest been located exclusively outside “the state” as traditionally understood: it 
has also—as we discuss in greater detail below—come from within the army and from the 
public sector. Neither protest, nor the power that it contests, can be mapped onto binary 
schemes of state-society or public-private: the powers of government and those of the 
governed are spread across overlapping assemblages of (inter alia) actors, artifacts, 
infrastructures, practices and meanings; the production of claims and effects within these 
assemblages provide a constitutive stake of political struggle (Parker, 2010).  While a full 
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accounting of this genealogy is beyond the scope of the current chapter, it should be kept in 
mind while reading what follows.  
Neoliberalism and the production of space: Articulating a landscape of power 
On 12 September 2006, two Egyptian construction workers were killed and 16 others 
injured when 3 floors of the Jordan Gate’s north tower collapsed during construction. 3 The 
event galvanized local residents who, backed by protests from within the Engineers 
Association, began to raise concerns about the project. Critics noted that the land had 
originally been expropriated under the pretense that it would be used for a public park. The 
case also demonstrated clear planning deficiencies: consideration had not been given to the 
extreme trafﬁc congestion that would result; nor had the impact of the towers on local water 
and sewage infrastructures been taken into account. Finally, there was concern about the 
Greater Amman Municipality’s (GAM) ﬁnancial stake in the project: how, asked residents, 
could the GAM be both a ﬁnancial stakeholder in the project and represent the concerns of 
citizens? Questions had been raised about the project from the outset, but were brushed 
aside—in part because the project had been endorsed by the King, who was eager to see 
progress on his vision of making Amman a destination city for investment, tourism and 
international agencies. In any case, the controversy led the king to dismiss Hadid, who was 
accused of incompetence, and of standing in the way of modernization.4 He was replaced by 
Omar Ma’ani, a prominent businessman. Ma’ani represented the business-oriented and 
managerial approach to government called for by the new vision. The incident also lent 
urgency to calls for master planning in Amman. At the time of the Jordan Gate incident, 
nearly 350 plans for high-rise buildings had been submitted to the GAM. The market was 
overheating, and speculation—fueled by surplus petro-dollars from the Gulf, together with 
Amman’s position as a logistical hub for operations in Iraq—was threatening to spiral out of 
control.5 
Ma’ani’s appointment was intended to send a signal to serious, long-term investors that 
Amman was open for business. Master planning was announced as a top priority to ensure 
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order and greater predictability in the real estate market. Ma’ani introduced a “one-stop 
shop” that would enable investors to bypass the GAM bureaucracy. It was also clear that 
more weight would be given to bodies like the Amman Commission: institutions that 
privileged private sector interests and expertise, and which opened the door to selected non-
governmental stakeholders, at the expense of traditional municipal agencies.  
But it was the Amman Master Plan itself—funded by USAID and executed by—that 
would prove to be Ma’ani’s most powerful instrument for leveraging change. Funded by 
USAID and executed by the global development consultancy Bearing Point through its 
subcontractor, the Canadian firm Planning Alliance, the plan was Ma’ani’s first priority upon 
taking office. The lead planner was Gerry Post, a Canadian planner who had been involved 
in the urban movements of Toronto in the 1970s before going on to work with Hernando 
Desoto in Peru in the 1980s, and then in South Asia before coming to Amman. He led a 
team that included several young Jordanian planners who had recently graduated from elite 
universities in the USA. The exercise was completed in just seven months. Nevertheless, in 
spite of this rapid execution, the plan won the ‘World Leadership Award in Town Planning’ in 
2007. The award granted the plan a kind of global legitimacy that empowered the Mayor vis-
à-vis existing GAM institutions. It also catapulted Post center-stage as a maker of the new 
order. He became a crucial ally of the new mayor.  
Together, they announced the formation of a new agency: The Amman Institute (Ai). 
Headquartered right next to the Mayors office and the Amman City Council chamber, the Ai 
positioned itself not only as planning institution, but also as an agent of governance reform 
and community empowerment. The Ai translated the book Corrupt Cities: A Guide to Cure 
and Prevention, making it available to a local audience. It invited speakers of international 
renown to address workshops on community empowerment and the imperatives and 
methods of social ‘modernization’ and change. And—again pre-empting and by-passing the 
existing GAM planning institutions—it took the lead role in designing and promoting dramatic 
changes to Amman’s historic city center. Post proved a dynamic and ambitious leader, 
Parker and Debruyne  
11 
ultimately branding the Ai as a ‘think-and-do tank’ positioned to serve not only Amman and 
Jordan, but the entire region. He was also aware of his role in shaking up a municipal 
bureaucracy that he saw as out of date and paralyzed by the municipal unions and ‘tribal’ 
interests.  
Central to Ma’ani’s ability to forward the change agenda was the fact that they were 
working in an environment that had been rescaled by the Master Plan itself. The Master Plan 
had increased the area of the Greater Amman Municipality from 668 km2 to 1,700km2. The 
amalgamation was legitimized by discourses of cost-efficiency and rational planning. 
However the managerial approach collided with the actually existing political structures in the 
outskirts of the Capital Amman that were integrated in the municipality. Gerry Post explained 
the amalgamation as follows: ‘(...)it is simple...the local power/tribal elite lost their power to 
influence decisions.  They don't care about level of public service; they care about lining their 
own pockets and those of their friends.’ 6 Such attitudes naturally met with resentment. As 
reforms set apace, frustrations accumulated: GAM employees felt undervalued; the elected 
members of the GAM Council were bypassed and “hated Ma’ani and the Ai”7 for it; Ammanis 
were confronted with the uneven developmental impact of big investment; and the mayors of 
the amalgamated towns around Amman lost power and saw the transformation of their areas 
on the basis of good governance-led market-reform. Post countered that the ‘Ai had a very 
close working relationship with GAM planning staff.’8 But GAM employees felt like they were 
left with the difficult work. The Ai knew how to ‘brand’ and sell their products, while the GAM 
planning staff had to disentangle all the complex property right structures, and solve the 
political and social conflicts that surfaced.9 According to Sandra Hiari (ex-Ai):  
“The Mayor, with the Ai behind him, declared the GAM incompetent. But they weren’t the 
ones that had to solve the severe land conflicts that were surfacing. They changed the 
zoning law radically, ignoring the history of existing law and also the existing situation at 
large. They treated planning as physical and technical and not as ‘political’ (…)…they had a 
sort of colonial approach, detached and uninformed by the local situation with its history and 
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context. When things went wrong, the GAM had to step in and solve the problems on the 
ground. At the end of the day, it was they who understood the politics and complexity of 
places, although they had to function within narrowly defined boundaries.”10  
These tensions became politically salient as the Ai pushed for a grand restructuring of 
the GAM. According to the Ai, the 22.000 employee strong apparatus needed to go ‘on a 
diet’. The reorganization plan—produced by the consultancy Watson and White Company--
put Ma’ani and the Ai on a collision course with GAM employees.11 From the perspective of 
Ma’ani and Post, a new global style of governing was bumping up again an ‘old’ Jordanian 
style. 
Key buzzwords in this new style included stakeholder participation and empowerment. 
Yet the new business-style municipality was experienced by Ammanis as distant from their 
daily lives. People (or at least selected representatives of populations or communities made 
visible by the plan) were perhaps being involved in the implementation of policy, but not in its 
formulation. There are many examples of this, but one of the most salient regards the ways 
in which the ‘reform’ of rent control laws was used to leverage change in Amman’s historic 
downtown with the aim of creating space there for investment in boutique tourism and high 
end leisure activities. In response to the removal of rent controls and the associated plans to 
‘upgrade’ Amman’s historic center, the downtown merchants initiated their own protests. On 
March 8th 2011 they closed their shops as a reaction to the new rent law.12A week later, on 
March 15th they were received by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Industry and Trade 
who did not exclude the possibility to change the rent law. However, the law was kept in 
effect, angering the merchants.  
The merchants weren’t the only group feeling excluded from the new Amman anymore. 
The static focus on ‘community development’ stood in stark contrast with the actual practice 
of community removal through gentrification or relocation for investor projects, 
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notwithstanding the protests of local communities in front of City Hall.13 As ex-employees of 
the Ai admitted:  
“community plans and the community aspect were brought in too late. There never 
seemed to be time for that. There was a sense of emergency related to planning for tower 
development and investment pressure. The neighborhood level analysis and ‘people 
centered plans’ came last. (…) By then all the expropriations, which occurred with no 
discussion about the future livelihoods of those removed, had engendered considerable 
tensions”14 
Communities were not only under threat of transformation by amalgamation and 
dispossession. The Master Plan called for a radical restructuring of Amman’s public 
transportation routes and infrastructure (see Parker, 2009). Existing hubs—and the popular 
markets associated with them—were moved away from the city center (and hence away 
from the sites slated for high end business, leisure and tourism investment). This not only 
affected the mobility and access of poorer people in the city, but also impacted upon the 
ways in which Amman was connected to (and available for) populations in the surrounding 
towns and countryside.  
But the ‘neoliberal’ urban project that would have the most impact on the city (and, as we 
show below, also on the countryside), was one that pre-dated the arrival of Ma’ani and Post: 
the Abdali Urban Regeneration Project, which promised nothing less that a new downtown 
for Amman. The Abdali project is in many ways emblematic of the neoliberalization or 
privatization of the state in Jordan: it shows how a state agency par excellence, the army, 
was transformed into a neoliberal actor invested in partnerships on a global scale. It 
accomplished this by making military land and property available to private investors at 
below market prices in exchange for shares in real-estate projects. Abdali—the location of a 
military installation that had once been on the outskirts of the city but which had long-since 
been swallowed whole by urban expansion—was one of several sites being transformed into 
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a neoliberal development hub fuelled primarily by sovereign wealth emanating from the Gulf 
(other key sites were located in Aqaba, Zarqa and the area south of the Dead Sea). 
The military established its own development corporation—MAWARED—as well as a 
planning and design company called The Urban Workshop. High ranking military personnel 
sit on the boards of MAWARED and The Urban Workshop together with new investments 
elites (including ‘players’ loyal to the Monarchy such as spatial planner Akram Abu Hamdan), 
representatives of Gulf investment agencies, and King Abdullah II himself. The significant 
profits generated by these arrangements were destined for reinvested in the army. As such, 
the army created the image of a self-sufficient modern army that no longer (fully) depends on 
the state budget. These investments/agencies would contribute to the military pension fund, 
and also be invested in job training centres, health care provision for veterans and their 
families, and social housing for servicemen and women. 
The specific investment structure and distribution of profits amongst well-connected 
investors has been discussed elsewhere, and is beyond the scope of the current paper.15 
Suffice it to say that—consistent with the outcome of similar neoliberal urban megaprojects 
elsewhere—those who profited were those who already had the wealth and connections that 
enabled them to do so. To be sure, critics (and the general public) argued that the sale of 
public land at below market prices was intrinsically corrupt. The huge profits stood in stark 
contrast to the public costs of government. GAM ultimately paid for the infrastructure and the 
road development around the project which amounted to 34 million JD.16 There was also a 
glaring disparity between investor profits and the enormous debts incurred by MAWARED. 
But the project was based on publically traded shares, and transactions were by and large 
carried within the boundaries of accepted best practice.  
We return to the discussion of corruption below. But the main points for the argument 
here are: 1) the ways in which these projects impacted directly on people’s lived experience 
of the city and its possibilities; and, most importantly, 2) the ways in which these urban 
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projects—via the involvement of traditional state institutions like the army and the Social 
Security Corporation (SSC), and new institutions like the Ai and the Aqaba Special 
Economic Zone Authority (ASEZA)—were key nodes in the restructuring of relations 
between government and the governed across the Kingdom as a whole. These issues 
directly link neoliberal urban projects like Abdali to the wider dynamics of protest. They also 
force us to consider the broader meaning of Henri Lefebvre’s celebrated (but often only 
partially understood) notion of “the right to the city.” For Lefebvre, the right to the city was not 
simply about access to urban space or the livelihoods of urban dwellers; it was about the 
centrality of the city within a wider mode of production, and about the urban as a modality of 
power (see Bogaert, 2014). The production of urban space is not something that happens 
exclusively (or even primarily) within the limits of the city itself, nor are the power relations 
articulated through the city contained within those limits.  
Regarding the first point, it was the GAM that (unwillingly) found itself responsible for 
clearing out the al-Za’amta neighborhood around Abdali in order to make way for the 
infrastructure that would service the Abdali site. The law permits the immediate removal of 
residents low compensations for reasons related to the public interest. Afterwards, though, 
the GAM sold the land to Abdali Investment and Development Corporation (Abdali PSC). It is 
worth noting that Ma’ani (Amman’s mayor) was also on the Board of Directors of 
MAWARED. Furthermore, the GAM—pressured by Abdali PSC and MAWARED—
intervened to relocate the popular Abdali Market, just as it had previously been made 
responsible for the relocation of the Abdali Bus station to the outskirts of the city. As the 
Abdali Urban Regeneration Project unfolded, the city of Amman was taken hostage by years 
of traffic jams because the infrastructure around Abdali was totally unsuitable for this kind of 
project (see Parker, 2009). Beyond the protest of the downtown merchants mentioned 
above, Amman has also witnessed protests by those who are immediately threatened by 
displacement and dispossession. Furthermore, as we show in later in the paper, it is no 
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coincidence that single most noteworthy incident of protest in Amman over the past three 
years involved the occupation of a traffic intersection/roundabout. 
In order to elaborate the second point, we now turn to a more detailed discussion of how 
the Army’s involvement in these projects provoked the emergence of a crucial actor within 
Jordan’s protest landscape: the movement of the Army Veterans Association, and the small 
town and rural constituencies that it in practice represents. We also show how neoliberal 
practices of government, and the urban projects associated with it, also gave rise to 2009 
protests by port workers in Aqaba. 
The rebirth of politics: Articulating the landscape of protest 
One of the most remarkable movements to emerge in the course of Jordanian Spring 
has been that of the retired army officers and veterans. The army has traditionally been 
viewed as the backbone of support for the monarchy in Jordan. And, like armies elsewhere, 
it has been understood as an intrinsically conservative institution. Active service personnel 
are forbidden from engaging in political activity. Yet, over the past three years, the 
movement of the retired officers and veterans has been the source of some of the most 
scathing critiques of the Palace: critiques in which figures associated with the Royal Court 
(especially the Queen) appear as neoliberalism personified. To understand the role of the 
retired officers in the Jordanian protest movement, it is first necessary to briefly situate the 
Army within the political history and political economy of the Kingdom. 
First of all, the army is not a homogenous institution. It embodies multiple sequences of 
ideological mobilization dating back at least to the establishment of the Mandate (e.g., 
radical and conservative brands of Arab nationalism, left- and right-wing East Bank 
nationalisms, participation in the social movements of the 1950s, involvements in the 
Palestinian struggle, the anti-normalization movement of the past 20 years, etc). The army is 
intersected by a variety of interests that, when examined closely, blur the boundaries 
between state and society as conventionally understood. This is in no way unique to the 
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Jordanian Army. Furthermore, today, the role of private contractors and other non-state 
actors in contemporary warfare challenge the traditional notion of the military as a state 
institution par excellence. There are various perspectives on these issues from within the 
army, and on the involvement of the army in schemes like the Abdali project (and others 
sketched below). Suffice it to say that the image of the army as politically quietist and 
uncritically loyal to the monarchy does not square with reality. 
Second, the army—together with all those who in some way indirectly depend upon 
military spending and employment—has been strongly affected by a changing political 
economy. The Army has always been a major employer and provider of social welfare in 
Jordan. The salience of this role has become more acute in the context widening inequality 
over the past 30-odd years. More than 25 per cent of the government budget goes to military 
expenditure, of which 85 per cent is reserved for wages for the 100.000 active soldiers and 
for the 65.000 reserve forces in the army. With an average of 5,4 members per Jordanian 
family, there must be around 890.000 citizens that are directly dependent on the army for 
their income.17 Notwithstanding the secrecy of the army budget, most interviewees refer to 
amounts that range between 400 and 600 million JD for 2006, and up to 1 to 1,9 billion JD 
for 2012.18 As such, the army could hardly be immune from pressure for cuts in government 
spending; however, at the same time, the crucial role of the army in redistribution and social 
welfare provision made such cuts politically problematic. The solution was to try and 
generate revenue by inscribing and integrating military assets into the market: in short, the 
Jordanian military went into business. 
The trend towards privatization within the army was initiated in 1990, shortly after the 
signing of Jordan’s first agreement with the international monetary agencies, when a small 
garage for repairing vehicles was opened in Mafraq.19 By 2001 the army had set up a 
complex web of investment platforms and interconnected entities, operating in different 
areas. The King Abdullah II Bureau for Design and Development (KADDB), for example, is 
the military-industrial arm of the Jordanian Armed Forces established by royal decree in 
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1999 and as such given ‘a free zone’-status (read ‘tax-free institution’). The Board of 
Directors reports directly to the Private Office of the King through the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. KADDB's operations are funded from the defence budget and earned income 
opportunities (Amara, 2008, p. 141). According to KADDB chairman Shadi Ramzi al-Majali 
the goal of KADDB is to set up a privatization process of the army (Marshall, 2013). At the 
2010 SOFEX - a KADDB organized arms industry conference- the bureau signed contracts 
for about 100 million US dollar worth of exports to Kenya, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.20 
KADDB reports a 100 million US dollar turnover per year and building up to 300 or 400 
million US dollar.21 Mawared and The Urban Workshop are—as noted above—also key 
assets in the army’s portfolio. 
The proceeds of these arrangements were supposed to be put in the Armed Forces 
Investment Fund” and reinvested in military hardware, pensions, job training centers, wage 
raises for the broad layers of the army.22 In fact, however, much of the money went to pay 
exorbitant consulting fees of companies that are now under fire,23 and to the inflated wages 
of army elites associated with the projects. This created different forms of protest both within 
the army ranks as well as between neoliberal elites, elite soldiers (such as the Darak) and 
the old guard army agencies. To many, it seemed clear that these arrangements constituted 
a bubble waiting to pop.24 
This concern was crucial in provoking protest from within the association of army 
veterans, an organization numbering some 150.000 members and 150 cooperatives. The 
army veterans were at the basis of the early protests.25 In fact, the problems started around 
2002, when the army veterans started calling for improvement to their livelihoods. They 
demanded three things: (1) increase in pensions, (2) better medical care and (3) higher 
social welfare. Some demands were met between 2002 and 2008. But when Samir Rifa’i 
came to power, this accommodating policy was put aside. Rifa’i championed neoliberal 
reforms and was the embodiment of all these techno-managerial interventions that 
disrespected the historical context and the existing political life on the ground. It is important 
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to stress that many of the ex-generals and veterans live amongst impoverished groups in 
society. This makes them particularly sensitive to the ‘everyday’ effects of neoliberal reform. 
After failed high-level negotiations, about corruption, transparent government and solving 
emerging tribal conflicts, they raised the stakes and called for protests from 2009 onwards.26 
The Army Veterans association led by Dr. Ali Habashneh wrote a first manifesto on the 
1st of May 2010, almost a year before the outbreak of the Arab Spring, attacking the 
Monarchy and the Royal NGO’s, and demanding a constitutional acknowledgement of the 
disengagement of the West Bank and stopping the Zionist scheme of ‘the Alternative 
Homeland’.27 They also demanded higher wages and pensions, threatening to step up their 
protests if their demands were not met.28After their first Manifesto, a second 'economic 
communiqué' followed in the autumn of the same year detailing the privatizations that they 
thought were corrupt in Jordan. A third manifesto addressed the neoliberalization of the 
Army and the embroilment of the monarchy in capitalist development schemes.29 
The second manifesto described MAWARED and ABDALI as examples of the failure of 
neoliberal governance, and also pointed to the 40 million JD of the Social Security 
Corporation (SSC) that was put into this project to save it. Lamia Raië, an independent 
consultant who had worked on a USAID-funded research about the protests, explained 
these army conflicts as follows:  
“The Ex-generals like Habashneh are not against investments by the Army as such, but 
they are against the Elitist Darak and the neoliberals in the Army that have taken over and 
turned the army into an ‘Al Capone type System.’ These generals have a Nasserite ideology 
or Baathist frame of reference, one that has today moderated into a more social-democratic 
leftist position. For example, Habashneh’s PhD dissertation was on the political economy of 
Jordan from a Marxist perspective.”30 
The veteran’s foray into contentious politics would ultimately pay off: they reached an 
agreement on pension raises,31 as well as on other demands including the tenure of military 
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retirees working in the public sector, and the annulment of a government decision to deduct 
75 percent of salaries of military retirees working in government jobs. This shows ‘the other 
face’ of the neoliberal army, which functions as a (social) safe haven for army (ex-) 
personnel.32 
The Army Veterans Association also made explicit links between developments in the 
Army and the privatizations of formerly nationalized industries such as the Jordan Potash 
Company and the Jordan Petroleum Refinery Company. This was crucial in connecting their 
demands to those being made in other arenas of protest. This expressed itself in the 
formation of a wider movement: in January 2012, the veterans organized themselves into a 
political party—The National Charter Party—around the figure of Ali Habashneh. Their 
platform called for the defence of Jordan against the Alternative Homeland and Zionist 
politics on the one hand, and for the re-nationalization of the economy and industries on the 
other hand. Soon, however, the party split into smaller groups. Left-nationalists followed 
Nahed Hattar to form the ‘Social National Liberation Party’ while the others followed 
Habashneh.33  
Nevertheless, this provided a platform enabling the (mostly East Bank) army veterans to 
connect with other groups such as the Teachers’ Association (which originated in Kerak 
around the figure of Mustapha Rawashdeh),34 and the “Jayeen movement”.35 Their first joint 
protest was on 24 January 2011, two weeks after the Dhiban informal workers’ strikes. The 
rise of the independent teachers’ union can be traced back to protests against the 
privatizations within the educational system. This included a scathing critique of Queen 
Rania’s ‘Madrassiti Initiative,’ a program that sought to mobilize the private sector to upgrade 
school infrastructure and create a curricula oriented towards entrepreneurship. The 
Teachers’ Syndicate also goes back to the history of Kerak as a space of resistance.  
It is important to note that while these movements each have a history—they emerge 
within the context of particular places and times—their activities increasingly reflected not 
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only new ways of doing politics, but also new ways of imagining solidarities across 
cleavages of locality and scale. And even if they emerged outside the give organizational 
frameworks of political representation and activism (the official unions, the professional 
associations, tribal affiliations, etc), they were all the more informed about the stakes of their 
struggles. Consider the 2009 strike of the Aqaba port workers. 
Protesters held signs demanding the company Al Maabar to give back the public money, 
Aqaba port and the privatized lands around it They accused ASEZA and ADC of having sold 
the land far under the market price. The land (3200 dunums) was sold for a below market 
price of 500 million US dollars, in which ASEZA had already invested 150 million US dollar in 
infrastructure costs, bringing the real price more closely to 350 million US dollar. On top of 
that ADC/ASEZA has agreed to additional infrastructure costs amounting to 200 million US 
dollars36 and agreed to pay enormous fines to the company (548.000 US dollar per day) 
because the Port relocation is slowed down.37 ASEZA defended itself, that the sale price 
was low, because they needed the money swiftly to pay off a loan to the Club of Paris, and 
at that time they were offering interesting interest rates. So they sold the land for 500 million 
US dollar to the Abu Dhabi government. Although ASEZA Chief Commissioner, at that time 
Issa Ayyoub, tried to defend the sale 38 , the Port land became a symbol of the ways 
government had been privatized under ASEZA and ADC. These new institutions, heavily 
funded by the international agencies, went against the interests of Aqaba residents. From 
2009 tensions were rising, ultimately pushing the Aqabawi’s, supported by a range of 
professional associations and leftist parties to the streets in 2010. 
Protestors didn’t limit their demands to financial compensation but also demanded the 
reform of ASEZA and ADC; pushing ASEZA to make some fundamental changes in the way 
Aqaba was being governed. Aqabites reached several goals from 2010 onwards after 
shutting down ASEZA four times39: (1) The commissioners were sent home (all of them for 
the first time) and they reached an agreement where three commissioners are now of "the 
community"40, i.e.; are locals: Dr. Monad Harrara from a Palestinian Family (‘Harrara’), One 
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of Al-Quwayra Family (‘Jadaad’), called Saleh Am-Jadaad, and one of Aqaba itself 
(Yassin’s). Also, the wages, which were at 18.000 JD per month, were lowered, and 
Aqabites pressured ASEZA to install the older will local consultative council that would be 
responsible for local co-production of policies. (2) ASEZA closed down all the massage 
parlours (mainly prostitution outlets). (3) As the strikes continued between February and 
December 2011, ASEZA was forced to extend fixed employment to 757 day-labourers who 
had been employed before October 2006. Also, workers in the water and electricity company 
got a wage rise. (4) Finally, ASEZA is now also proposing to build new houses for low-wage 
workers.  
But the issue people found most ‘corrupt’ was the governance model of ASEZA itself. 
ASEZA had been accused of more than 50 cases of corruption, including false bids and 
skewed contracts as well as the corruption in the quality of the materials used in the Karama 
project and the King’s Makrama housing project. 41  While groups of people and 
neighbourhoods were increasingly facing  nights under the open skies and stars, the only 
stars the Commissioners were seeing were the five-star hotels in which they lived during the 
week. This was uneven development at its most embodied point. The protests paid off in the 
local struggle against corruption, as the protesters forced parliament to form a special Aqaba 
Parliamentary Commission to study all the cases of corruption.42 And, to return to where we 
started, two other salient victims of popular demands to root out corruption were none other 
than Omar Ma’ani and Gerry Post, whom the government seemed willing to sacrifice as 
scapegoats in order to deflect criticism of the wider ‘process of reform.’43 
Claiming the right to the city: Articulating the critique  
On 24th of March 2011 protesters occupied the Duwwar al-Dakhilliyyeh (the “Interior 
Ministry Circle”), a large traffic roundabout at one of Amman’s busiest intersections. 
Nationalist hymns of the 1950s blarred through loudspeakers. Banners hung from bridges 
and buildings. Thousands of people showed up to participate. The place and the date were 
chosen deliberately, referring not only to earlier era of protest in Jordan, but also to the 
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Battle of Karama in 1968, where Jordanian troops joined the PLO ‘Fedayeen’ to repell an 
Israeli incursion into the Kingdom.44 A range of movements had come together to organize 
the event, forming what was to become known as ‘the March 24th Youth Movement platform’ 
or ‘the March 24th Coalition.’45 Their greivences focused on the effects of economic reform, 
and on what they perceived as the increasing intrusion of the state’s security and 
surveillance apparatus into everyday social and economic life. The platform not only brought 
together leftist and communist militants. Initially, the youth movement of the Muslim 
Brotherhood participated as well. The platform was also supported by the “Jayeen.”46 As in 
the past—with the Jordanian National Movement of the 1950s, for example—the March 24th 
Youth Movement platform surmounted the traditional fault lines within society (See: ICG, 
2012, p. 16). As Mohammed Sneid, a leading member of “Jayeen”, said: “Palestinians and 
East Bankers both suffer from the current parliament, which represents the rich from both 
sides” (ICG, 2012, p. 5). But this claim in and of itself could not erase another pronounced 
social cleavage in Jordan: that between the city and the country.  
While protesters from various neighborhoods in Amman were gathering at the duwwar, 
another group—some 20.000 strong—was gathering on the other side of Amman, in King 
Hussein Park. These protesters were not from Amman, but mostly from towns and villages 
north of the capital. They had come for a to defend the Palace. These protesters felt that the 
palace had already fallen under the sway of a liberal, “Palestinan” elite—an elite who had 
benefitted from privatization and the politics of economic reform more generally. They 
worried that the demands of these urban protesters might push the balance further towards 
urban business interests at their expense.  About mid-day, they began to move en mass 
from King Hussein Park, eventually advancing on the duwwar. There were major 
altercations, and the Darak (the elite troops-gendarmerie), appeared to intervene on the side 
of those who had marched from the park. One man died, and a hundred were wounded.  
The day after, the protesters reorganized to express their anger about the violence used 
by the Darak.47 But dominant voices such as the Prime Minister Marouf Bakhit reacted 
Reassembling the Political 
24 
swiftly, pointing to the Muslim Brothers and the Jordanian Palestinians as the root cause of 
the violence. The 24th of March Coalition suddenly became tagged as a Palestinian anti-
Royalist movement; the government playing the identity game and pitting Jordanians of East 
Bank origins against those with roots in Palestine. This plays into popular anxieties that go 
back to the days of ‘Black September’, and which have been reinforced by the 
overrepresentation of East Bankers in the security apparatus and public sector more 
generally. Also, the Muslim Brotherhood had chanted slogans calling for reform to an 
electoral system that favored rural constituencies and favored deals based on regional or 
tribal interests rather than on ideologial affiliations. These events played into local 
stereotypes (often repeated uncritically by academics and journalists) that pitted traditional 
East Bank rurals against liberal (or otherwise ideological) urban dwellers. This has been 
reflected much of the analysis of the Jordanian Spring. History, however, shows that these 
groups have in fact often stood side-by-side, not only in the nationalist heydey of the 1950s, 
but also in the protest landscape that emerged after 1989. 
By zooming in on placemaking projects in Amman and Aqaba, we set out to reveal 
configurations of capital and power hidden within a landscape of government that has 
become increasingly (or at least differently) variegated over the past twenty-five years. We 
also situated groups within the uneven geography of development that can be mapped over 
and through that landscape. The point was to call attention to the material contexts of 
meaning and practice within which protest has been situated. Struggles start from particular 
places, and not in abstract-extended space. Place therefore matters for social struggles. 
Above, we traced the agencies and practices implicated in the production of neoliberal urban 
space/place, and showed how these projects impacted upon the lives of both rural and city-
dwelling Jordanians. Yet, in spite of this underlying connection, protestors from different 
parts of the country percieved themselves as having very different stakes in whatever 
change might coming, and these were expressed in identities that presented themselves not 
only as essential (urban-Palestinian v rural/tribal-Transjordanian), but also seemingly 
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irreconcilable. In the remainder of the paper, we look at the roads traveled by the protesters 
as they began to challenge these essentialisms and make the connections, developing a 
critique—and articulating a framework of action—that could build upon and potentially 
transcend the ‘militant particularisms’ (Williams, 1989; Harvey, 1996) on display in the early 
days of the Jordanian hirak.48 
It would be easy (indeed, too easy) to look at events in Jordan and suggest that the 
tranformative potential of the protests had been undermined by such “militant particularism:” 
the particular and place-bound character of claims put forward in the context of the 
Jordanian Spring seem—at first sight—difficult to reconcile. They provide those in power 
with a resource that can be manipulated for purposes of divide and rule. Indeed, this 
particularism and it’s manipulation have been put forward to explain the relative failure of 
Jordan’s protest movement to effect radical change (and, vis-versa, the apparent stability of 
“the regime” has been seen as evidence of a fragmented and manipulated population). 
However, this is a relatively superficial reading, one that evaluates the protests ‘from 
above’—from the perspective of a particular notion of the regime—rather than from the lived 
contexts of the governed. Just as the urban megaprojects in Amman and Aqaba 
rearticulated not only urban relations, but also relations between government and the 
governed in rural many rural areas (as described above), so efforts have been made to 
connect to hirak groups in secondary cities and towns across the Kingdom (e.g., Kerak, 
Ma’an and Tafileh). To be sure, such efforts have faced significant obstacles. But protest has 
given rise to a critique of current (neoliberal) government practice that transcends 
boundaries of place, and that cuts across ideology. 
As the protest of 24 March was put down by the Darak, Jordanian elites thought they had 
dealt with the upsurge of protest in early 2011. Instead, however, the protests were about to 
travel. While small scale protests continued in Amman, demonstrations in Jordan’s 
secondary cities—most notably in Kerak, Tafileh and Ma’an—increased in number and 
intensity laying the foundations of what has become know as ‘the Southern Movement.’ The 
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Southern Movement eventually became the leading bloc within the March 24 Platform, and 
played a key role in articulating movements across the country.49 The Ammani’s lost their 
leadership position but gained a broader spatial network of activism (See also: ICG, 2012, p. 
17).  
The Southern Movement was made up of Popular Youth Movements from Kerak, 
Mafraq, Jerash, the Free Tafileh Movement and the Ma’an Popular Movement for Change 
and Reform– or the so-called ‘HirakSiyasi’. The HirakSiyasi raised demands forsocial justice, 
political reform, against the privatization of government and public resources and against 
corruption50. Most of the interviewees stated that Jordanians are not so much moved by the 
political reforms, but by  economic issues. “That’s where protesters clash with the King and 
the Monarchy, [the latter] promise some political reforms, but don’t touch the money.”51 
Places like Tafileh of Kerak started to play their role in the spatial connections made beyond 
these bounded spaces. Together with the examples of ‘corruption’ provided above, these 
‘events’ began to circulate and mobilize people in different parts of the country. Efforts to 
cross given boundaries of place and ideology were not always straightforward. For example, 
when the Muslim Brotherhood took control of the teachers union, leftists organized against 
them.52 By contrast, the Southern Movement was particularly successful in mobilizing across 
ideological lines, bringing Islamists, leftists and nationalists together under one roof. This in 
turn facilitated efforts by the movement to reach out to various groups and actors across the 
Kingdom.53 There are even indications that leaders of the Movement in Tafileh have reached 
out to the militant Islamist movement of Abu Sayyaf, which is based in Ma’an. 
In May 2011 formation of ‘the National Front for Reform’ was announced—partly in 
response to the establishment of a Transjordanian-based political party by Ali al-
Habashneh—with Ahmed Obeidat at its helm. The National Front gained supprt from elite 
circles within Amman, as well as from the more grassroots Muslim Brotherhood. Obeidat is a 
former Prime Minister (serving between January 10, 1984 and April 4, 1985) and headed the 
General Intelligence Department for almost a decade from 1974 to 1982. He carried with him 
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the image of being one of the last unifiers of Jordan, because of his role in the ‘national 
charter’. The movement’s members include the Democratic People's Party (Hashd), the 
Communist Party, the Popular Unity Party, the Islamic Action Front, the Baathist Progressive 
Party, the Socialist Party, the Nation and the Movement of the Social Left, as well as a 
number of professional associations and leading labor figures, the Women's Union and 
Youth bodies.54  
The National Front for Reform put forward a series of demands, including: 1) 
constitutional and political reform focused on the rule of law and human rights (including 
cancellation of illiberal amendments made to the Constitution of 1952); 2) the return to an 
economic approach that affirms state ownership of public resources and strategic projects, 
and the adoption of planning as a key political tool to guide the economy and society, taking 
into consideration market mechanisms and the participation of the productive private sector 
in a manner that integrates its activities with the national plan for development without the 
exploitation of workers and consumers; 3) a more optimal allocation of resources, and 
policies that achieve social justice in the distribution of income and wealth; and (4) the 
reaffirmation of Jordan’s territorial identity and sovereignty, going against Zionist schemes of 
the Alternative Homeland.  
Although this entanglement of movements is precarious, it illustrates that supposedly 
essential and insurmountable ruptures based on identity are foremost political, and not 
natural givens.55 As Khalid Kalaldeh asserts: “It’s a class issue and it’s about capitalism, and 
not about ‘East versus West’. As if Palestinians didn’t work in the public sector?”56 The same 
happened, Lamis Andoni continued, in Tafileh. “First the Tafileh people carried this East-
West Bank identity divide with them, until I wrote a few articles about them, supporting them 
in their struggle. People who dared to attack me as a Palestinian journalist got in trouble 
after that. They internally adopted a pro-Palestinian stance throughout time. You need more 
concrete struggles between groups, where they take these images of each other down.. 
These barriers can be crossed and links are being made. I always tried to integrate similar 
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stories of suppression next to each other, and now my nickname is “the river Jordan’ that 
connects the two banks.” 57 
Where the ‘moderate urban liberals’ pushed for a soft change and reform, the leftist 
movements and popular hirak movements gradually evolved towards a call for radical 
change, including impeachment of the King (but not overthrow of the monarchy as such) and 
throwing out what they refer to as ‘the Mafia’,  ‘gang’ or ‘the Clique’ seen to dominate his 
immediate circle. The King was initially held beyond direct criticism. But, this so-called ‘red 
line’ was crossed gradually, especially after November 2011 when the price of various 
petroleum products skyrocketed in the range of 14 to 54 percent,.58 Because the costs of 
electricity and transportation are reliant on petroleum derivatives, the increase automatically 
caused price increases in almost all commodities. This provided enough impetus for 
protesters from various opposition factions to take to the streets.  
In the early months of the protests, charges of corruption were directed primarily towards 
crony capitalists and ‘corrupt personalities.’ Omar Ma’ani, Khalid Shaheen, Akram Abu 
Hamdan and others provided lightning rods for public discontent. Yet, while some of these 
figures were clearly engaged in practices that would be considered corrupt by any standard, 
the focus on individuals deflected critique away from the broader project of reform. The 
‘offenses’ of Ma’ani, for example, were were in fact consistent with notions of managerial 
best practice and market-oriented notions of good governance: Ma’ani was a stand-in—or 
perhaps better said, a scapegoat—for the failures and contradictions of the neoliberal project 
as a whole. This emphasis on ‘crony capitalism’ and corruption is, of course, prominent in 
analysis about the Arab Spring: the problem, from this mainstream perspective, was not one 
with neoliberalism or with reform, but with its incomplete or incompetent implimentation.59 
Insofar as the spotlight was pointed at individual criminals and scapegoats, the government 
and the palace took advantage of space in the shadows to implement measures that would 
address some concrete and particular demands of protesters without challenging the logic or 
project of restructuring. The National Dialogue Commission (NDC) was, for example, set up 
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in the summer of 2011 and given the assignment to continue with reform more swiftly and 
more efficient. Constitutional reforms were submitted to the National Constitutional 
Commission (NCC). As the protests continued, the embarked on visits to areas on the 
outskirts of the cities, and to the Badia areas. During a visit to the Kura district (Irbid 
governorate), the King promised 40 million JD for development projects. In Kerak, 4,7 million 
JD was promised for poor families, and the Badawi Tribe in Zarqa got more army jobs. 
Meanwhile, in Ma’an several millions of Dollars were promised for infrastructural projects 
(Lenner & Bouziane, 2011). These are ways to revive the old social contract between the 
state and several parts of the population.  
These piece-meal engineering attempts of ‘reform’ would not hold for long, however. 
Protesters continued to defy the red lines. Several ‘tribes’, mostly presented as the 
ideological and sociological pillars of the Hashemite monarchy, started mobilizing. One 
example is the creation of the Jordanian Tribal Coalition for Reform in November 2011, that 
called for political and economic reforms.60 Members are the Bani Sakhr Tribe Assembly for 
Reform, and six other tribal committees representing Jordan's largest East-Banker tribes, 
including Bani Hassan, D'ajaa, Ajarmah, and the National Movement for Reform 
representing the Northern Badia district. Earlier, in February 2011, several protests had 
emerged as in Zarqa where the Zawahreh and Khalayleh tribes blocked the highway, and 
claimed back their “tribal lands”, referring to collective ownership patterns from before the 
Ottoman Tanzimat reform.61 Whatever the tactics of diversion, it was clear they wouldn’t 
suffice. 
Crossing red lines: Dis-placing and re-placing the political 
In June 2012, the King paid a visit to Tafileh. He bore the promise of 15 million JD in 
development funding. However, on his arrival, a scuffle broke out between demonstrators 
and gendarmerie, sparking a riot. The royal motorcade was attacked with stones,62 and 
demonstrators shouted “the people are the red line”.63  
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This and other slogans popped up in larger demonstrations, over the ensuing months. 
Protesters were now openly criticizing the Monarchy and its links to investors. On 13 
November 2012, more than 2,000 protesters were back at the duwwar ad-dakhaliyya 
chanted "Revolution, revolution, it is a popular revolution" and "Freedom is from God, in 
spite of you, Abdullah" during an impromptu demonstration sparked by the governments 
decision to raise fuel prices.64 Other slogans that were used in that period were “Either fix it 
now, or follow Abidine [Ben Ali]”, “This Jordan is our Jordan, and the traitor should get away 
from us”, “Freedom, freedom, not royal handouts”, “Freedom from God, against your will oh 
Abdullah”, “The people want the fall of the regime” and “Down, down with the rule of the 
scoundrel]”.65  
As the protests spread over the whole of Jordan,66 Queen Rania came under fire. A 
range of high profile tribal figures questioned the role the Queen was playing in Jordan’s 
political and economic power structure, pointing specifically to the lavish spending on her 
birthday party in Wadi Rum. Everything related to her person became a target of critique.  
Gradually, she was coming to be seen as the personification of everything wrong with 
neoliberal reform. She was ordered to lay low for a while.67 Other members of the Royal 
family also became the target of harsh criticism, such as her brother Majdi Yassin, and 
Princess Basma’s husband ‘Walid Kurdi’. Kurdi fled to London for his role in stealing 
hundreds of millions of JD’s from the Jordanian National Phosphate Company which he 
managed between 2007 and 2012. It was increasingly becoming clear that the wder circles 
of the royal family/entourage were benefitting from privatizations schemes. The legitimacy of 
the monarchy as such could no longer could no longer taken for granted. More recently, in 
March 2013, during a demonstration in Amman, ‘harsh slogans were chanted against the 
Jordanian regime, blasting its reform measures as "a mere theatrical play," and warned 
against repercussions of lack of real reform changes demanded by the people.”68 While the 
possibility of “regime collapse” is highly unlikely, talk of a so-called ‘Plan B’—referring to the 
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possibility that Abdullah might be replaced by his brother, Hamza’—was increasingly being 
aired openly.  
Free-wheeling investors and the Monarchy were not the only ones under fire. Protesters 
also condemned the involvement of donors such as USAID in the neoliberal project, rallying 
in front of the US embassy to decry ‘Capitalism, global neoliberalism, privatization, and the 
role of the private sector.’. 69  As Khalid Kalaldeh notes: ‘By 2004, there were 24 
“independent” agencies supported by USAID. By now, they support another 64 new 
“independent” agencies. The loans for those mainly neoliberal governance agencies are 2 
billion JD. So, what will we do when that support falls away?”70 The question remains if these 
efforts are sustainable, and to what extent the mere promise of development, reform and 
local participation will contain future protest. The debts of Jordan are rising. The Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) promised a grant of 5 billion US dollar, but with unclear pre-
conditions.71 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided a 2 billion US dollar loan, but 
this was accompanied by austerity conditions. Meanwhile, other USAID loans providing 
guarantees on Jordanian government bonds for the amount of 1.250 billion US dollar for a 
period of up to 7 years72 cannot sufficiently fill up the Treasury to address the needs and 
demands of Jordanians. Also, the interference of these foreign agencies contributes to the 
all-round dissatisfaction and anger. As we write, petitions are circulating, road blocks are 
being erected by tribes calling for a return to ‘traditional’ collective land rights,73 informal 
unions are emerging to demand social rights, and youth movement coalitions are claiming 
not only political rights and citizenship, but also demanding the nationalization of resources 
and key industries. Smaller demonstrations continue to surface weekly throughout the 
country, and—while still dispersed—there is increasing convergence around demands for 
‘systemic change’. 
Conclusion 
While protest in Jordan has not been revolutionary, the Hashemite Kingdom has 
undoubtably witnessed a rebirth of the political. In order to understand this rebirth—and to 
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recognize the stakes that are involved in protesters efforts to reassemble the political—the 
Jordanian protest movement must be situated in a landscape of government and uneven 
development that has emerged over 25 years of neoliberal reform.  
Jordan does not present us with a clear-cut case of protestors confronting a regime. It is 
not about state power v people power. Rather, it offers a story about how people struggle 
(some, by necessity, more than others) to craft and reassemble the relations of place and 
meaning from which both these modalities of power (and others) emerge, and within which 
they are deployed. Neoliberalism provides a framework of legibility within which claims about 
power and meaning might be asserted. It is therefore not simply about the introduction of 
new practices, but about reinventing the old, inscribing them into new frameworks of 
calculation, and imbuing them with new meaning (just think about how notions like resilience, 
empowerment and community have become buzzwords that naturalize neoliberal agencies 
and effects). One needs to examine not only neoliberal claims and assumptions, but also 
actual modalities of neoliberal practice, and the ways in which that practice relates to, and 
draws power from, practices that do not appear at first glance to have anything at all to do 
with neoliberalism. And one must start not from abstract claims, but from an awareness of 
how these practices have impacted upon people’s lived experience, and of the ways in 
which that experience informs perceptions of political and socio-economic possibility.  
In a world where power is diffused through an astonishingly variegated array of sites and 
agencies, where the local sources of power are difficult to distinguish from the distant, and 
where the question of “who is really governing” has no clear answer, transformation cannot 
merely be a matter of attacking a regime or laying claim to a state apparatus (Parker, 2010). 
The neoliberal situation thus problematizes efforts at transformational protest. At the same 
time, however, this might present protestors with a political situation that is as open as it has 
ever been. People protest not to express a critique, but to find one. It is in the course of 
protest that the whereabouts of power are revealed and (potentially) held to account. As 
such, the task of protest is not simply to occupy space, but rearticulate it; and it is not only to 
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inscribe itself into the place of power (and into the world), but to fundamentally remake that 
place (and the world). Neoliberalism’s stunning success in this regard should suggest that 
such a constitutive project is not a romantic pipe-dream: it has been done, and can be done 
again. 
*The authors contributed equally (albeit differently) to making of this chapter. They would 
like to say a special thanks to Sami Zemni for his helpful feedback on earlier drafts of the 
chapter, and for his tremendous support during the course of the research that went in to i
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